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The Reality of Phantom Limbsl
Joel Katzz
This paper ualuates the joint influence of peripheral neurophysiological factors
and higher-order cognitive and ffictive processes in trigeing or madulating
a variety of phantow limb uperiences, includ.ing pain. Part I outlines one way
in whbh the sympathetic nervaw rystem may influence phantom limb pain-
A model involving a sympathetic-efferent somatic-afferent cycle is presented to
oeplain fluctuations in the intensity of sewations refer"d to the phantorn limb.
In part 2, the model b stended to explain the puzzling futding that only after
amputatinn are thaughts and feelings capable of evaking referred sensati.ons
to the (phantom) limb. While phantom pains and other sensations frequently
are tigered by though* and feelings, there is no evidence that the painful or
painl.ess phantom limb is a symptom of a psychological disorder. In part 3,
the concept of a pain "memory" is introduced and descibed with examples.
The data show that pain expeienced pior to amputation rnay percist in the
form of a memory refened to the phantom limb causing continued suffeing
and distress. It is argued that two independent and potentially dissocinble
memoty components underlie the unified expertence of a pain memory. This
conceptualization is evaluated in the context of the suryical arena, raising the
possibility that under ceriain conditions postoperative pain may, in part, reflect
the persistent central neural memory trace Ieft by the surgical procedure. It is
concluded that the experience of a phantom lirnb is determined by a comple,r
interection of inputs fram the periphery and widespreael reginns af the brain
subserving sensoty, cognitive, and afective processes.
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Many patients awaken from the anaesthetic after an amputation believing
that the operation has not been performed. Their perception of the lost
limb is so real.that not until they lift the bed sheets to see it do they realize
it has been cut off. This startling realization has little effect on the reality
of the limb they experience, and in some cases may even intensiS the sen-
sations that define it. Weir Mitchell (1871) coined the term phantom limb
to describe the persisting sensory awareness of a limb after amputation.
A distinction is usually made between the painful and nonpainful
phantom limb (Melzack & Wall, 1988). The most salient property of the
nonpainful phantom is its tingling, "pins-and-needles" feeling (paresthe-
sias), but other qualities of sensation include temperature, postrre, Iength,
volume, and movement (Jensen & Rasmussen, 1989). Recent studies esti-
mate the incidenoe of the nonpainful phantom at approximately 80Vo to
1007o (Jensen & Rasmussen, 1989). For rnany amputees, however, a dis-
tressing problem is phantom limb pain (Sherman, 1989). Dysesthesias are
common; many patients report a painful intensification of the paresthesias
or pins-and-needles sensation that defines the nonpainful phantom limb.
Some sufferers describe bouts of paroxysmal shooting pains that travel up
and down the limb. Others report tbe phantom to be in a cramped or
othenrise unnatural posture that gives rise to excruciating pain. Many am-
putees describe the pain in the phantom limb as indistinguishable from the
pain they experienced in the limb prior to amputation, In still others, the
phantom is the seat of an intense burning pain as if the hand or foot were
being held too close to an open flame. Frequently amputees suffer from
several types of pain (Jensen & Rasmussen, 1989).
A recent survey based on several thousand amputees reveals that
more than 70Vo eontinue to experience phantom limb pain of considerable
intensity more than 25 years after amputation (Sherman, Sherman, &
Parker, 1984), Equally striking is the low success rate of treatments for
phantom limb pain: In the long term only 7Vo of patients are helped by
the more than 50 types of therapy used to treat phantom limb pain (Sher-
man, 1,989). This intractability reflects our ignorance about the mechanisms
that contribute to phantom limb pain.
A controversy has arisen over the origin of the phantom limb. In an
attempt to find a single explanatory mechanism, theories have focused on
only one aspect of phantom limb e4perience and have ignored or discounted
others (Melzack & Wall, 1988). The cause has been sought in the activity
of primary afferent fibers, spinal cord cells, and supraspinal sensory nuclei
$ensen & Rasmussen, 1989; Melzack & Wall, 1988). Another class of theory
has attempted to account for the phantom solely on the basis of psycho-
logical and emotional processes (Szasz, 1975). Melzack (1989) recently con-
cluded that the phantom limb cannot be explained by a unitary mechanism
-whether peripheral, central, or psychological. He proposed a theory inwhich the simultaneous outputs of neural networks in widespread regions
of the brain combine to produce the various qualities of human experience.
This paper reviews some of the peripheral, central, psychological, and emo-
tional factors that contribute to phantom limb experience.
SYMPATHETIC NERVOUS SYSTEM CONTRIBUTIONS TO
PHANTOM LIMB EXPERIENCE
Phantom Limb Pain
Evidence that the sympathetic newous system is involved in phantom
limb and stump pain comes from studies of procedures that pharxlacologi-
cally block (Livingston, 1943) or surgically interrupt (Kallio, 1950) the sym-
pathetic supply to the involved limb with at least temporary alleviation of
pain. Transient re*ef from phantom limb pain also has been reported with
propranolol (Marsland, Weekes, Atkinson, & I-eong, 1982). Electrical and
mechaaicat stimulation of the lumbar sympathetic chain produces intense
pain referred to the pbantom limb whereas, in nonamputee pain patients,
the sensations are referred to the abdomen or flank (Noordenbos, 1959).
Regional sympathetic hyperactivity may also contribute to the development
of phantom limb pain through excessive vasoconstiction and sweating at
the stump and surrounding regions (Livingston, 1943). The condition may
spread centrally from the stump to involve the phantom limb. Hyperalgesia
(heightened pain) and allodynia (pain arising from gentle touch) may be
referred to the phantom limb upon stimulation of the stump whether or
not the stump is painful or shows signs of trophic or vascular changes
(Doupe, Cullen, & Chance, 1944). The characteristic qualities of superficial
burning pain and deep aching pain may provide additional evidence of sym-
pathetic nervous system involvement (Doupe et al., 1944).
Despite frequent assertions that the sympathetic nervous s5rstem is
involved in the production and maintenance of phantom limb pain, sur-
prisingly few studies have compared correlates of peripheral sympathetic
nervous system activity at the stump and contralateral limb, Sliosberg
(1948) examined 141 amputees and found the stump to be cooler than the
intact limb in 94 of them but he did not relate the temperature difference
to the presence or absence of phantom limb pain. Kristen, Lukeschitsch,
Plattner, Sigmund, and Resch (1984) assessed phantom and stump pains
using thermography and found that a "patchy asymmetrical temperature"
distribution of the stump thermograms was significantly more frequent
among stump pain sufferers than in patients who were free from stump
pain. However, when examined for the presence of phantom limb pain,
thermographic records taken of the stump were no different for patients
with or without phantom limb pain. Nystrom and Hagbarth (1981) made
microneurog&phic recordings of activity from muscle nerve fascicles of the
peroneal nerve in a patient with a below-knee amputation who suffered
from intense cramping pain referred to the phantom foot. Although bursts
of activity in sympathetic fibers were accentuated by the Valsalva maneuver,
the phantom pain remained unchanged suggesting that, in this patient, the
cramping pain was independent of peripheral sympathetic nervous system
activity.
In contrast Sherman and his colleagues (Sherman, 1984; Sherman &
Bruno, 1987) recently observed a negative correlation between temperature
at the stump and the presence of burning phantom limb and stump pain
indicating that reduced blood flow to the stump is associated with increased
levels of pain. Katz (L992) followed up this line of inquiry and compared
skin conductance and surface skin temperature of the stump and contralat-
eral limb in amputees reporting phantom limb pain (Group PLP), non-
painful phantom limb sensations (Group PIS), or no phantom limb at all
(Group No PL). The results showed that mean skin temperature was sig-
nificantly lower at the stump than the contralateral limb in Groups PLP
and PIS, but not Group No PL.
These results suggest that the presence of a phantom limb, whether
painful or painless, is related to the sympathetic-efferent outflow of cuta-
neous vasoconstrictor fibers in the stump and stump neuromas. The related
finding that stump skin condr:ctance responses over time correlafed signifi-
cantly with the intensity of phantom limb paresthesias, but not other quali
ties of sensation, supports the hypotbesis (outlined below) of a
sympathetic -efferent somatic-afferent mechanism involving both sudomotor
and vasoconstrictor fibers. The most parsimonious explanation of these
findings is that the paresthetic or dysesthetic component of the phantom
limb may be triggered by sympathetic-efferent activity (Kat2,1992).
Phantom Limb Paresthesias
Although a normal phantom occurs whenever nerve impulses from
the periphery are blocked or otherwise removed (Wall, 1981), it is also
true that direct stimulation of the amputation stump frequently exaggerates
the tingling or paresthetic quality of sensation typical of the painless phan-
tom fimb (Carlen, Wall, Nadvorna, & Steinbach, 1978). Careful questioning
of amputees reveals that the nonpainful phantom limb is not perceived as
a static phenomenon. The paresthetic quality of sensation, which defines
the phantom limb percept, is in a constant state of flux, with changes oc-
curring in intensity, body part, or both. For example, Katz, France, and
Mehack (1989) reported a subject whose phantom sensations consisted of
a "numbness" that defined a region including the tateral three toes, Within
this circumscribed area, he experienced rapid "waves of numbness" that
increased and decreased the intensity of the involved phantom parts.
One mechanism that has been proposed to account for the paresthetic
component of the phantom limb is a cycle of sympathetic-efferent somatic-
afferent activity (Katz, 1992; Katz et al., 1989). As shown in Fig. 1, stump
skin conductance levels correlate significantly over time with the intensity
of phantom limb paresthesias. It is hypothesized that changes in the inten-
sity of phantom limb paresthesias reflect the joint activity of cholinergic
(sudomotor) and noradrenergic (vasomotor) postganglionic sympathetic fi-
bers on primary afferents located in the stump and stump neuromas
(Fig. 2). Release of acetylcholine and noradrenaline from postganglionic
Time (minutes)
Fig. 1. A minute-by-minute plot of the relationship beiween stump skin conductance
and the intensity of nonpainful phanlom limb paresthesias for a subject with an
amputation above the knee. Skin conductance was continuously measured at the stump
over a 63-min period while the subject monitored the intensity of the phantom timb
by turning a dial. Phantom limb intensity ratings have been translormed so that a value
of 0,O represents the intensity at the slart of the session and dcviations from zero
correspond to increases and decreases in phantom limb intensity. Each data point
represents a mean of 30 values consecutively sampled at 2-s intervals. Note that changes
in the intensity of paresthesias (described by the subject as increases and decreases in
"numb" sensations referred to the phantom toes) occur in concert with changes in
stump skin conductance. (Adapted from Katz et al,, 1989, with permission.)
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Flg. 2. Schematic diagram illustrating a mechanism of sympathetically-generated
phantom limb paresthesias. Spontaneous activity or excitalory inputs descendiag from
cortex (e,ge due to the perception of a salient event, loud noise, thought, feeling, etc.)
increase the discharge rate of pregarglionic (pg) sympathetic neurons with cell bodies
in the lateral horn (LH) of the spinal cord and terminals in the sympathetic ganglion(SG). These neurons excite postganglionic noradrenergic (NA) cutaneous
vasoconstrictor (cvc) and cholinergic (ACh) sudomotor (sm) fibers that impinge on
effector organs (vascular smooth muscle and sweat glands) in the stump and on sprouts
from large diameter primary afferent (pa) fibers that have been trapped in a neuroma.
The release of ACh and NA on effector organs results in increased electrodermal
activity (EDA) and decreased blood flow (BF) to the stump. Release of these chemicals
in the neuroma activates primary afferents that project to spinal cord dorsal horn (DH)
cells subserving the ampltnted parts of the limb, These neurons, in turn, feed back to
the preganglionic sympathelic neurons and project rostrally where the impulses
contribute to the perception of phantom limb paresthesias. If DH cells have been
sensitized due to injury, or nociceptive primary afferents arc activated, then the
perception may be dysesthetic. (Reproduced with permission trom Katz, 1992.)
sympathetic fibers produces transient vasoconstriction and heightened skin
conductance responses. As well, neurotransmitter release onto apposing pe-
ripheral fibers trapped in stump neuromas increases primary afferent dis-
charge. This information is transmitted rostrally where it gives rise to re-
ferred phantom sensations upon reaching central structures subserving the
amputated parts of the limb. The moment-to-moment fluctuations in the
intensity of phantom limb paresthesias reported by many amputees may,
in part, reflect a qcle of sympathetic-efferent somatic-afferent activity. In-
creases in the intensity of phantom limb paresthesias would follow bursts
of sympathetic activity and decreases would correspond to periods of rela-
tive qympathetic inactivity.
The possibility that heightened electrodermal activity at the stump
occurs as a consequence of the perception of a change in the intensity of
paresthesias does not appear to be tenable, since shooting pains, somato-
sensory memories, and phantom limb movements do not also correlate with
stump skin conductance (Katz, 1992). That is, changes in stump skin con-
ductance are related only to the perception ofparesthesias and not to other
qualities of sensation. Thus, the paresthetic component of the phantom
limb represents the perceptual correlate of a central autonomic mechanism
that operates on peripheral structures. In the following section, this mecha-
nism is elaborated to explain how psychological and emotional processes
alter phantom limb sensations.
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND EMOTTONAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO
PIIANTOM LIMB EXPERIENCE
It is not surprising that amputees suffering with phantom limb pain
exhibit higher than normal levels of pqychological and emotional distress.
Depression (Caplan & Hackett, 1963; Lindesay, 1985; Sherman, Sherman,
& Bruno, 1987; Shukla, Sahu, Tripathi, & Gupta, 1982r, anxiety (Parkes,
1973; Shukla et al., 1982), and other forms of psychopathologl are common
(Morgenstern, L970; Parkes, 1973; Shukla et al,, 1982; Steigerwald, Brass,
& Krainick, 1981). Moreover, amputees with severe phantom limb pain
score higher on psychological inventories measuring depression (Lindesay,
1985) and neuroticism (Morgenstern, 1970) than do amputees who have
little or no pain.
The occurrence of phantom limb pain and psychological disturbance
has led to three conclusions: (1) Pain is a symptom of a psychologicat dis-
order (Parkes, !973; Szasz, 1975), (2) psychological disturbance is a con-
sequence of pain (Sherman & Bruno, 1987), or (3) the two are causally
unrelated (Caplan & Hackett, 1963). At present, the consensus is that there
is no difference in the prevalence rates of pain of psychological origin
among amputees and the general population. There is no evidence to sug,
gest that surgical amputation predisposes an individual to develop pain of
psychological origin, nor that patients who undergo amputation are at
greater risk for developing such pain. However, a prospective study has yet
to be conducted in which preoperative measures of psychological and emo-
tional functioning are obtained sufficiently prior to amputation so as to
avoid the confounding effects of preamputation pain and hospitalization.
Psychodynamic Explanations
Psychodynamic explanations of phantom limb phenomena have been
advanced as evidence of the amputee's difficulty in adapting to the muti-
lated state (Frazier & Kolb, L970; Parkes, 1973; Parkes & Napier, 1975;
Szasz, 1975). Denial (of the loss or the associated affect) and repression
are the most common defense mechanisms proposed to explain the pres-
ence of a painless phantom (Szasz, 1975), painful phantom (Parkes, 193;
Parkes & Napier, 1975; Stengel, 1965; Szasz, 1975), and various alterations
in the form of the phantom limb (Abramson & Feibel, 1981; Weiss, 1958).
Though often elegantly formulated, psychodynamic explanations are
not consistent with the accurnulation of physiological and psychological
data. For example, many amputees become profoundly depressed after sur-
gery,yet phantom pain and other sensations persist. The cooccurrence of
depression and pain is inconsistent with the role of denial since the intense
negative affect implies awareness, if not acceptance, of the loss (Caplan &
Hackett, 1963). In fact, for many amputees, the affect associated with the
loss is so overrrhelming that it cannot be contained and seems to "spill
over" into the phantom thereby increasing the intensity of paresthesias
(Simmel, 1959).
There are other inconsistencies between psychodynamic theory and
empirical evidence. Apparently healthy individuals who, by all objective
measures, have adjusted to the amputation continue to report the presence
of a phantom years after amputation (Simmel 1959). Phantoms that occur
after injury to the central nervous system (CNS) (e.g., when sensory and
motor nerve roots are torn from the spinal cord or the spinal cord is tran-
sected) are similar to amputation phantoms in quality of sensation even
though the real limb(s) is still present but totally anaesthetic and paralyzed.
One would not expect denial of the loss of function to produce a phantom
defined by paresthesias (Weinstein, 1962). Phantcms do not develop if the
process of sensory loss is gradual, as in leprosy (Price, 1976), yet there
should be as great a need for denial in these cases. Finally, procedures
that temporarily block the supply of afferent impulses from reaching the
CNS (e.g., anaesthetic nerve blocks, blood pressure cuff occlusion) reliably
result in the perception of a phantom limb which persists until the flow of
afferent input has been restored (Melzack & Bromage, 1973; Wall, 1981).
Under these circumstances, it is difficult to see the need of a phantom
limb to fulfill the putarive ego-protective function of defending the indi-
vidual from a loss,
Although denial is more commonly associated with diseases that have
no visual evidence of infirmitf (Caplan & Hackett, 1963), the foregoing
does not imply that denial of the loss, affect, illness, or future implications
plays no part in the overall adaptation to amputation (Rosen, 1950). Pa-
tients may demonstrate their denial of the importance of these realities in
a variety of ways (Bradway, Malone, Racy, L,eal, & Poole, 1984; Turgay &
Sonuvar, 1983), but these do not include having a phantom. For the vast
majority of amputees, the presence of a phantom limb 
-painful or painless
-is not a symptom of a psychological disorder.
C ha rac tero logical Disturbanc es
In addition to the role of specific defense mechanisms in the genesis
of phantom limb pain, it is postulated that phantom limb pain may be psy-
chologically determined by characterological disturbances such as "compur,
sive self-reliance" and "rigidity" (Parkes, Lg73). With the exception of a
recent review (sherman et al., 1.987), the idea that patients with persisting
phantom limb pain are rigid and exhibit compulsively self-reliant person-
ality characteristics has been uncritically accepted by researchers and cli-
nicians working in the field of phantom limb pain (Dawson & Arnold, 1981;
Dernham, 1986; Lundberg & Guggenheim, 1986; Shukla et al., 1982) de-
spite the absence of empirical evidence to support this view.
The association between the presence of pain and psychological dis-
tress (e.g., depression and anxiety) or particular personaliry traits or styles
(e.g., rigidity and compulsive self-reliance) may be influenced by biased
sampling procedures so that the characteristics of a select group of patients
(e.g., those referred to a pain center) come to define the popllation at
large (Merskey, 1989; Sherman et al., 1987). Sherman er al. suggested that
the low success rate of most treatments far phantom limb pain serves as
a deterrent to all but the most persistent or self-reliant individuals. long
after less assertive patients have given up actively seeking help, these suf-
ferers of phantom limb pain continue to search for relief despite repeated
failures. According to sherman et al., this self-selection bias explains the
tendency for individuals with compulsively self-reliant personality charac-
teristics and phantom limb pain to dominate the clinical picture of the typi-
cal patient with phantom limb pain.
Recent studies indicate that among an unselected sample of ampu-
teeso those with phantom limb pain, painless phantom limb sensations, or
no phantom limb at all cannot be distinguished by their scores on the
Eysenck Personality Inventory, Beck Depression Inventory, Spielberger
State or Trait Anxiety Inventory, or a mood rating scale (Katz & Melzaclg
1990, 1991). Moreover, the results show that there are no significant inter-
group differences in scores on a questionnaire designed to measure psy-
chological rigidity as defined by a tendency to persist in behaviors that were
effective at one time, or in a particular situation, but no longer are ade-
quate to accomplish current goals,
Psychobgical and Emotional Processes Influence Phantom Limb Expeience
As reviewed above, idea that emotional and psychological processes
can cause pain traditionally has been tied to the notion of psychopathology.
However, it is becoming increasingly clear that under certain circumstances
pain may be triggered by these processes in psychologically healthy indi-
viduals as well. Although instances of psychologically or emotionally trig-
gered pain and psychopathology may be present in the same amputee, their
cooccurrence should not be taken as pima facie evidence of a causal link.
It is commonly accepted that anxiety or stress influences pain per-
ception and subsequent behavior (Merskey, 1989). The aggravation or al-
leviation of pain referred to phantom body parts also may be mediated in
part by psychological processes that alter anxiety levels (Kolb, 1954). Phan-
tom breast pain after mastectomy is provoked by emotional distress in 6Vo
of women 3 weeks after surgery and in 29Vo l year later (Krgner, Krebs,
Skov, & Jprgensen, 1989). Fifty percent of lower-extremity amputees report
that attacks of phantom limb pain are triggered by emotional distress (Jen-
sen, Krebs, Nielsen, & Rasmussen, 1985) as long as 7 years after amputa-
tion (Krebs, Jensen, Krdner, Nielsen, & J$rgensen, 1985). A combination
of progressive relaxation training and electromyographic biofeedback of
stump and forehead muscles produces significant reductions of phantom
limb pain and anxiety (Sherman, 1976\ that are sustained for up to 3 years
(Sherman, Gall, & Gormly, 1979). Finally, stress levels and pain intensity
ratings sampled over a 180-day observation period correlate significantly
for most amputees (Arena, Sherman, & Bruno, 1990).
There are also examples of psychological or emotional processes pre-
cipitating transient but profound alterations in the quality and intensity of
phantom limb sensations. These processes include hypnosis (Schilder,
1950), concentration (Morgenstern, 1964; Riddoch, l94I), disraction
(Parkes, L973), relaxation (Sherman, 1976; Sherman et al., 1979), fright
(Henderson & Smyth, 1.948), forceful rerninders of the events that led to
amputation (Simmel, 1956), the sight of other amputees (Simmel, 1956),
and witnessing cruel and violent acts (Pilowsky & Kaufman, 1965; Stengel,
1965). One amputee, interviewed by the present writer, described his re-
action to an accident involving his wife by reporting " . . goose bumps
and cold shivering down the phanrom [eg]. It went through me. Everything
emotional will get you that." Another amputee stated, "It's like everything
I feel goes there-the good and the bad."
A Centrally Trtgered Sympathetic-Efferent Somatic-Afferent Mechanism
The material presented above indicates that cognitive and affective
processes reliably trigger transient pains or sensations referred to the phan-
tom limb. The model schematically represented in Fig. 2 outlines a mecha-
nism through which cognitive and affective processes associated with higher
cortical and limbic centers may alter phantom limb sensations. The recip-
rocal connections between cortical, limbic and lateral hypothalamic struc-
tures are well dacumented (Brodal, 1981"; Smith & DeVito, 1984). The
lateral hypothalamus is involved in the control and integration of neural
activity associated with affectively charged behavior (Brodal, 1981; Melzack
& Casey, 1968; Smith & DeVito, 1984) and has direct projections to the
lateral horn of the spinal cord. The intensity of phantom limb paresthesias
and dysesthesias may thus be modulated by higher brain centers involved
in cognitive and affective processes vra a multisynaptic network of descend-
ing inputs that impinges on preganglionic sympathetic neurons producing
diffuse peripheral autonomic discharge and activation of primary afferent
fibers located in stump neuromas.
Occasionally, the effects of intense affect (e.g., fright, horror) are ex-
perienced diffusely over the entire body as cutis anserina associated with
pilomotor contraction (i.e., "goose bumps"), Among amputees, however, a
more frequent occurrence is that the perception of less salient events and
emotions precipitates.these sensations througholt only the phantom limb.
The tendency for affectively charged and psychologically meaningful expe-
riences to be referred to the phantom limb, but not to other parts of the
body, is consistent with two lines of evidence suggesting that the threshold
for impulse generation is lower both in regenerating primary afferents in
the stump and in deafferented central cells subserving the phantom limb
than it is in the intact nervous system.
First, regenerating sprouts, which are trapped in a neuroma, are ex-
ceedingly sensitive to the postganglionic sympathetic neurotransmitters no-
radrenaline (Wall & Gutnick, 1974) and acerylcholine (Diamond, 1959),
and they discharge rapidly when these substances are present, In contrast,
intact peripheral fibers do not show this chemosensitivity, and thus have a
higher threshold compared with regenerating sprouts. Second, the loss of
afferent nerve impulses (deafferentation) resulting from amputation pro-
duces a disinhibition of cells in the dorsal horn and more rostral sensory
structures gling rise to the perception of a phantom limb (Melzack & I-oe-
ser, 1978; Wall, 1981). This consequence of deafferentation implies that
the threshold for detecting sympathetically triggered afferent impulses aris-
rng from stump neuromas should be lower than at other, intact body sites
since stump impulses would be subject to less inhibition upon reaching the
spinal cord. This fits well with the observation that the threshold for de-
tecting sensations in the phantom limb during stimulation of the stump is
lower than at the site of stimulation itself (Carlen et al., 1978).
Another possibility is that amputation leads to increased expression
of alpha-l adrenergic receptors located on mechanoreceptors or nocicep-
tors (Campbell, Meyer, Davis, & Raja, 1992) in stump neuromas. This hy-
pothesis would explain the perception of phantom limb paresthesias or
dyesthesias in the absence of regional sympathetic hyperactivity. Taken to-
gether, these observations may explain the puzzling finding that only after
amputation does the (phan:om) limb become the site of affectively or cog-
nitively triggered sensations.
The suggestion that the perception of phantom limb sensations may
reflect the activity of postganglionic sympathetic fibers on stump primary af-
ferents is obviously not meant to imply that paresthesias arise only from a
peripheral source. Blocking the afferent supply to a body region is sufficient
to produce the experience of a painless phantom defined by paresthesias
(Melzack & Bromage, 1973; Wall, 1981) and electrical stimulation of the me-
dial lemniscal pathway gives rise to the sensation of paresthesias referred to
the territory subserved by the cells being stimulated (Tasker, Organ, &
Hawrylyshyn, 1982). Moreover, it is likely that through repeated activation,
neural circuitry is strengthened among brain regions subserving cognitive, af-
fective, and sensory processes so that phantom limb sensations and pain may
be riggered by thoughts and feelings in the absence of primary afferent feed-
back from peripheral structures (I*Doux, L989; lrventhal, 1982).
Implications for Treatment of Phantom Limb Pain
Given that cognitive and affective processes may trigger or exacerbate
phantom limb pain, it is of the utmost importance that patients be prepared
prior to amputation for the presence of a phantom limb. Patient education
programs and treatment of stress prior to and after amputation have be-
come standard practice (Butler, Turkal, & Seidl, 1992; McGrath & Hillier,
1992; Sherman, 1989). Patients who are ill prepared psychologically for am-
putation suffer needlessly with phantom limb pain and concern about their
sanity (Solomon & Schmidt, 1978).
Finally, it is noteworthy that mental stress and anxiety not only pro-
voke transient increases in the intensity of phantom limb sensations and
pain (Arena et al., 1990; Sherman, 1976; Sherman et al., 1979), but rhey
also induce reflex bursting activity in cutaneous sudomotor and vasomotor
sympathetic fibers (Delius, Hagbarth, Hongell, & Wallin, 19721' Hagbarth,
Hallin, Hongell, Torebjdrk, & Wallin, 1972), Moreover, distraction or at-
tention diversion (and intense concentration) which reduces phantom limb
pain (Morgenstern, 1964; Parkes, 1973) also diminishes peripheral sympa-
thetic neryous systern activity (Hagbarth et al., 197?\ These findings pro-
vide support for the model shown in Fig. 2 and suggest that relaxation
training and other cognitive strategies directed at anxiety reduction and
increasing self-control may be effective in reducing phantom limb pain in
certain amputees.
PAIN MEMORIES IN PHANTOM LIMBS AND
DEAFFERENTED STRUCTURES
A striking property of phantom limb pain is the presence of a pain
that existed in a limb prior to its amputation (Melzack, 1971'), This class
of phantom limb pain is characterized by the persistence or recurrence of
a previous pain, has the same qualities of sensation, and is experienced in
the same region of the limb as the preamputation pain (Katz & Melzack,
1990). Cases studies of amputees have revealed pain "memories" of painful
diabetic foot ulcers, bedsores, gangrene, corns, blisters, ingrown toenails,
cuts and deep tissue injuries, and damage to joints and bony structures.
As well, the phantom limb may assume the same painful posture as that
of the real limb prior to amputation, especially if the arm or leg had been
immobilized for a prolonged period.
The proportion of amputees who report similar pain before and after
amputation may be as high as79Vo (Katz & Melzack, 1990). Pain memories
in phantom limbs appear to be less common when there has been a dis-
continuity, or a pain-free interval, between the experience of pain and am-
putation. This is consistent with the observation that relief of limb pain by
continuous epidural blockade for 3 days before amputation decreases the
incidence of phantom limb pain 6 months later (Bach, Noreng, & Tj6llden,
1988). Furthermore, compared with pain that is temporally noncontiguon$
with amputation, pain experienced at or near the time of amputation has
a higher probability of persisting into the phantom limb (Jensen et al., L985;
Katz & Melzack, 1990).
Pain also persists in patients with deafferentation that does not in-
volve amputation. In these conditions, the involved body part is still present
but it is devoid of sensibility due to an interruption in the supply of sensory
(afferent) information (i.e., deafferentation). Brachial plexus avulsions, in
which the sensory nerve roots supplying the arm and hand are torn from
the spinal cord, often produce pain that is felt in the deafferented and
anesthetic region (Jensen & Rasmussen, 1989; Reisner, 1981). Similarln
patients with spinal cord injuries (Berger & Gerstenbrand, 1981; Conomy,
1973) may complain of pain referred to body parts below the level of the
transection. For example, Nathan (1962\ described a patient who mntinued
to feel the pain of an ingrown toenail after a complete spinal mrd break.
As well, patients undergoing spinal anesthesia (Van Bogaert, 1934; Wall-
gren, 1954) and those with injuries of the brachial plexus or spinal cord
sometirnes report that a limb is in the same uncomfortable, often painful,
posture it was in prior to the injury or block. These postural phantom sen-
sations do not usually persist beyond several days and in most cases are at
least temporarily reversed by competing visual inputs which reveal a dis-
sociation between the real and felt limb(s).
Painful and nonpainful sensations also persist or recur after surgical
removal or deafferentation of body structures other than the limbs, such as
breasts (Krpner et al., 1989), teeth (Marbach, 1978; Sicuteri, Nicolodi, Fusco,
& Orlando, 1991), and internal and special sense organs. Ulcer pain has
been reported to persist after subtotal gastrectomy with removal of the ulcer
(Gloyne, 1954). Patients have reported labor pain and menstrual cramps
after total hpterectomy (Dorpat, 1971), rectal pain (Boas, Schug, & Acland,
1993) and hemorrhoids (Oveson, Krgner, @rnsholt, & Bach, 1991) after re-
moval of the rectum and anus, the burning pain of cystitis affer complete
removal of the bladder (Brena & Sammons,1979), and the pain of a severely
ulcerated cornea after enucleation of an eye (Minski, 1943).
As noted above, not all phantom limb memories are of painful ex-
periences. Nonpainful preamputation sensations do recur but they are not
as common and tend to include the sensation of objects that were once
worn on the limb. These superad"ded sensations (Haber, 1956) vary in com-
plexity from such simple somatosensory qualities as the sensation of ban-
dages that once wrapped a wound (Friedmann, 1978; K^tz & Melzack,
1990), a plaster cast (Danke, 1981.), finger rings, and wristwatches (Fried-
mann, 1978; Haber, 1956) to the multimodal, perceptually integrated phe-
nomenon of a phantom foot clad in a sock and a shoe of specific type and
color (Katz & Melzack, 1990),
Superadded sensations in phantom limbs bear a striking resemblance
to a type of tactile hallucination in patients with lesions of the parietal
lobe (Allen, L973; Critchley, 197t). With such "spontaneous stereognostic
sensations . . . the patient has a feeling as if something were $ng in the
palm of one hand. The feeling may be so vivid that the patient can go on
to describe the size, shape, tefiure and temperature of the object, and he
may be astonished to find later that the hand is really empty" (Critchley,
1971, p.91). Allen presents a detailed case study of a patient, who upon
recovering from the anesthetic following removal of a large tumor from
the left postrolandic sensory cortex, thought he was holding an object in
his right hand. Over the next 2 days the shape and size of the objects he
felt varied. "At one time he felt a smooth, round object which he described
as 'like a ball which just fits into the palm of my hand.' Again, he felt
'something rough and jagged and hard like a piece of road granite.' Later
he felt'a flat round object-like a ladies'small mirror.'He also felt a
long, round object 'like a long, round pencil case,' and an object 'like a
matchbox"' (Allen, 1928, p. 138).
Taken together, these case reports and studies of amputees reveal
that pain memories are not merely images or cognitive recollections; they
are direct experiences of pain that resemble an earlier pain in location and
quality. They are perceptually complex experiences that may even involve
inforrnation from multiple sensory modalities including visual, olfactory,
tactile, and motor components that had accompanied the original experi-
ence. The precise details of the experiences of pain involve localization,
discrimination, affect, and evaluation-that is, all the dimensions of per-
ceptual experience-and these properties are a function of integrated
brain activity. It is likely that the outputs of sensitized spinal cells activate
the neural structures in the brain that subserve memories of earlier events,
Separate Somatosensory and Cognitive Memory
Components Underlie Pain Memortes
A closer examination of the phenomenon suggests that the experience
of a pain memory reflects the joint activity of two separate memory sub-
systems with properties and functions specialized for processing somata-
sensory and cognitive (declarative) information, respectively. The
somatosewory memory component consists of the same, or very similar, neu-
ral circuitry that was activated by the peripheral input prior to amputation.
It is a higher-order functional unit that codes the temporal and spatial pat-
terning of nerve impulses specifying the body part, quality of sensation,
and intensity of the somatosensory experience.
The cognitive memoty component contains declarative information re-
lated to when and in what context the preamputation pain occurred as well
as meta-information about the body part, quality of sensation, and intensity
of the preamputation experience. The declarative information contained in
the cognitive component provides the unique, personal meaning associated
with the somatosensory component and provides a basis for the identi$ing
label and response (e.g., "my pain", a corn, diabetic ulcer, etc.). The de-
termination that a current sensory impression has occurred before involves
a process of recognition: One must know, or have access to knowledge
about, what one has (and therefore has not) previously experienced in or-
der to state whethgr two experiences separated in time are the same or
different.
To clari$ the distinction between the two forms of memory, consider
an amputee who occasionally feels the painful "hole" on his phantom shin
corresponding to a long-standing preamputation ulcer as well as the sen-
sation of the bandages that once wrapped the wound. Stripped of the dec-
larative information contained in the cognitive component, which sewes to
identiff and give meaning to the somatosensory qualities of the phantom
pain, the sensation of bandages wrapping the wound would probably be
described nonspecifically in terms of a band of light pressure or tightness
around the leg. That is, the somatosensory descriptions used to convey the
sensation are the same regardless of whether or not the cognitive compo-
nent is present. But when the cognitive component has been activated, the
descriptive response includes a unique identifying label (e.g., "bandages"),
the phantom limb experience is accompanied by a sense of familiarity, and
the patient has access to declarative information that ties the somatosen-
sory qualities of the sensation to the original event.
Evidpnce of a Double Dissocintion Between
Somatosensory and Cogtitive Components
There is evidence that it is possible to demonstrate a double disso-
ciation of these two memory components. Evidence of the cognitive com-
ponent in the absence of the somatosensory component is common and
occurs whenever amputees recall details about a preamputation pain (e.g.,
its duration, quality of sensation, location, intensity) without also reexper-
iencing the somatosensory qualities of that pain (Katz & Melzack,1990).
Dissociation of the opposite kind is not as common and is more difficult
to demonstrate since without the knowledge (i.e., contents of the cognitive
memory component) of what one has felt in the past, the reactivation of
the somatosensory qualities of a past pain would be perceived as novel and
therefore would not be recognized as having occurred before. Moreover,
it is rare to find a situation in which (1) an amputee demonstrates amnesia
or forgetting (of the contents of the cognitive memory component) and (2)
an indepdndent source had verified the nature of the pain at the time of
injury before amputation.
Nevertheless, there are several lines of evidence supporting dissocia-
tion of this kind. The first comes from experiments that model the phantom
limb in animals (Katz, Vaccarino, C-oderre, & Melzack, 1991). Sectioning
the sciatic and saphenous nerves in the rat is followed by self-mutilation
(autotomy) of the denervated hindpaw. It is well established that autotomy
is a response to pain or dysesthesias (painful paresthesias or tingling) re-
ferred to the anesthetic limb and represents a model of the phantom limb.
A brief thermal injury of a specific region of the hindpaw just prior to
nerve sections changes the usual pattern of autotomy over the following
days. Animals injured before, but not after, nerve sections direct autotomy
to the site of prior injury. Since the nerve sections produce a deafferenta-
tion of the entire hindpaw, the central effects of the injury are sustained
in the absence of further inputs from the hindpaw, implying that painful
or dysesthetic sensations are referred specifically to the region of the den-
ervated limb that had received the injury.
The correspondence between the sites of prior injury and subsequent
autotomy parallels descriptions of human amputees who report the persist-
ence of a preamputation pain or lesion referred to the same location of the
phantom limb. In these experiments (Katz et al.,I99l), the injury was always
induced while the rats were under a general anesthetic, and they were main-
tained under the general anesthetic until well after the sciatic and saphenous
nerve transections had been performed. Thus, although the rats never ex-
perienced the thermal injury in an awake state, their behavior in the days
after the lerve sections revealed that the effects of the injury were still ca-
pable ol influencing perception and behavior (in the absence of further in-
puts from the injured region). These findings provide empirical support far
the hypothesis that the unified experience of a pain memory involves two
pot€ntially dissociable forms of memory, one of which (the somatosensory
component) is independent of the conscious experience of pain.
Lacroix, Melzack, Smith, and Mitchell (L992) recently provided com-
pelling clinical evidence of a dissociation between the cognitive and soma-
tosensory memory components, They report the case of a 16-year-old girl
who was born with a congenital deformity of the right foot which was am-
putated when she was just 6 years old. At the time of the interview 10
years after amputation, the patient reported a flat phantom foot that was
stuck in a forward position. This description corresponded to information
subsequently obtained from her medical records verifring a right flatfoot
which was locked in an equinovalgus position and incapable of moyement.
Interestingly, the patient was not aware that her foot had been deformed
as a child, for she mistakenly described her foot as she "remembered" it
prior to amputation as being normal and freely mobile. This case report
demonstrates the remarkable capacity of the central nervous system to re-
tain, for years after amputation, a complete representation of the cut-off
part including its somatosensory qualities, proprioceptive sensibility, and
associated motor program. Moreover, the case demonstrates that the neural
circuitry underlying the somatosensory component is capable of being ac-
tivated and of influencing conscious awareness independent of the cognitive
component.
Although separate representations of the somatosensory and cognitive
components are formed during repeated occurrences of the preamputation
pain, such frequent and temporally contiguous activity would result in a
tendency for these representations to occur more often together than alone
once the limb has been removed. There is evidence that the two memory
systems may be reciprocally connected so that activation of either memory
component can lead to activation of the other. The presence of the soma-
tosensory component is sufficient to activate the contents of the cognitive
component as implied by the process of recognition involved when a patient
identifies the samatosensory qualities of the experience as having occurred
before. The possibility also exists that the link is bidirectional. One subject
in the study by Katz and Melzack (1990) reported that he could reproduce
at will the sensation of the o'hole" from a gangrenous ulcer he had on the
medial aspect of his foot prior to amputation, but if he did not concenffate
on it, the somatosensory component remained out of his awareness. It is
important to note, however, that activation of the representation underlying
the cognitive component is not to be equated with the conscious awareness
of thoughts about the past pain, but when such thoughts occur, excitation
of the corresponding neural assemblies must have been involved.
Implications of Separate Memory Components
There are important implications associated with the suggestion that
separate somatosensory and cognitive memoly systems underlie pain that
persists after amputation. For one, conscious awareness of the contents of
the cognitive memory component is not necessary for the reactivation of
the somatosensory component (although it may facilitate the process when
present). Second, it is clear that the conscious experience of pain is not a
necessary condition for the formation of the somatcsensory memory com-
ponent. That is, the formation of the somatosensory component can occur
even when there is no conscious awareness of pain at the time of injury
or trauma (Katz et al., 1992; Katz et al., 1991) or when the cognitive com-
ponent is not accessible through introspection (Lacroix et al.,1992),
These findings raise the possibility that, just as brief, intense pain ex-
perienced in a limb shortly before its amputation persists as phantom limb
pain memory (Katz & Melzack, 1990), the effects of the primary afferent
"injury discharge" on spinal cord dorsal horn neurons produced by surgical
incision (and subsequent cutting of muscle, nerve, and bone) may also pro-
duce lasting changes that later contribute to postoperative pain. This im-
plies that both somatosensory and cognitive systems must be blocked in
order to interfere with the formation of a pain memory arising from the
surgical procedure (Fig. 3).
Patients who have sustained traumatic amputation either by accident,
combat-related injury, or emergency surgical procedures carried out with-
out anesthetics or analgesics (e.g., in war-ravaged parts of the world) are
at highest risk for developing posramputation problems (Fig. 3a). Traumatic
amputation would be expected to result in the formation of both the so-
matosensory and cognitive memory components. The expected outcome
would include heightened stump pain (stump hyperalgesia), heightened
phantom limb pain intensit!, recognition of the somatosensory qualities of
the pain, and a posttraumatic stress disorder arising from the traumatic
events.
Amputation performed under general anesthesia alone (Fig. 3b) would
interfere with the formation of the cognitive but not the somatosensory mem-
ory component. However, unlike a pain memory that resembles a long-
standing preamputation lesion, the somatosensory qualities of postsurgical
pain would not be recognized by a patient whose surgery was performed
under a general anesthetic, since the patient would not have had any con-
scious experience of pain at the time of incision and amputation. upon
awakening from the general anesthetic, the patient's complaints of pain
would reflect the persistent central neural memory trace left by the surgical
procedure in addition to input from transected fibers in the amputation
stump (wall, 1989). This is hypothesized to result in enhanced postoperative
phantom limb pain and heightened pain at the sire of the incision (incisional
hyperalgesia).
Administration of spinal local anesthesia alone (Fig. 3c) would block
the formation of the somatosensory but not the cogrzitive memory compo-
nent. The preincisional spinal blockade would prevent the injury barrage
from reaching the cNS, resulting in less intense postoperative phantom
Iimb pain and incisional pain. However, in the absence of a general anes-
thetic, awareness during amputation can produce vivid declarative memo-
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ries of operating room events that develop into a posttraumatic stress dis-
order.
C-ombined use of spinal anesthesia and general anesthesia (Fig. 3d)
would be expected to interfere with both somatosensory and cognitive mem-
ory systems by blocking the transmission of nociceptive impulses (arising
from the cutting of tissue, nerve and bone) at the level of the spinal cord,
and by ensuring that the patient is unconscious during the surgical proce-
dure. Recent studies of patients undergoing surgery show that combined
use of general anesthesia plus preincisional epidural adminisffation of an
opioid (Katz et al., 1992) or preincisional local anesthetic infiltration
(Ejlersen, Bryde Anderson, Eliasen, & Mogensen,1992) is more effective
in reducing postoperative pain and/or analgesic requirements than com-
bined use of general anesthesia plus postincisional (Katz et al., L992) or
postsurgical (Ejlersen et al., 1992) administration of the same agent by the
same route. The efficacy of preemptive analgesia has yet to be evaluated
for limb amputation.
Factors That InJluence the Formstian and Reactivatinn of Pain Memories
Amputation or Deffirentation. When a missing or completely anes-
thetic limb continues to be the source of pain that resembles an old injury,
it is reasonable to assume that the pain is centrally represented. It is un-
clear, however, whether the interruption of normal sensory nerve impulses
(deafferentation) or amputation is necessary for pain memories to develop.
The interruption of afferent input associated with amputation or deaffer-
entation may facilitate the central neural changes that ccntribute to the
formation of pain memories by removing normal inhibitory control mecha-
nisms (see Coderre, Katz, Vaccarino, & Melzack, 1993 for a review).
Alternatively, deafferentation may merely provide a condition under
which persistent CNS activity becomes obvious to the observer since the
peripheral source has been removed or its afferent supply interrupted. This
may explain why pain memories are almost exclusively reported to occur
in patients with deafferenting lesions and rarely under other circumstances.
Examples of recurring pain in the absence of obvious deafferentation in-
clude cardiac pain referred to the site of a compression fracture in the
upper back sustained 20 years earlier (Henry & Montuschi, 19?8) and pain,
in response to stimulation of the nasal mucosa, referred to teeth that had
recently been filled (Hutchins & Reynolds, L947; Reynolds & Hutchins,
1948). Noordenbos and Wall (198i) described seven patients with partial
peripheral nerve injury and subsequent pain who underwent nerve resection
and graft cr ligation. Following a pain-free period all seven redeveloped
pain of the same quality and in the same location as they had experienced
prior to nerve resection, although in some patients the recurrence of pain
was restricted to a smaller area within the originally painful region.
ff deafferentation or amputation is not a necessary condition for a
pain memory to develop, then we must ask why they are reported s,o in-
frequently among patients in whom the flow of afferent impulses has not
been intemrpted. One possibility is that certain peripheral injuries do be-
come represented centrally, but because the peripheral source of pain is
so obvious (e.9., a surgical incision), the existence of a central somatosen-
sory component is not even considered. For example, it has been shown
that postoperative pain following thoracic surgery is less intense if patients
received a general anesthetic plus an epidural opioid infused before incision
vs. a general anesthetic plus an epidural opioid infused 15 min afer incision
(Katz et al., L992). Nociceptive impulses during surgery reach the spinal
cord and contribute to a state of persistent central sensitization that in-
creases postoperative pain intensity after the patient awakens from the gen-
eral anesthetic. Blocking nociceptive inputs before but not after incision
attenuates the development of the central somalos€nsory component. The
obvious source of ongoing pair after surgery (i.e., the incision) may blind
the observer to the possibility that the very act of cutting may have set up
a permanent represenfation that amplifies subsequent inputs from the
wound.
The possibility that a central somatosensory component may be
masked by the more obvious peripheral source of pain is further supported
by studies of patients undergoing electrical brain stimulation during neuro-
surgical procedures. Pain is rarely elicited by test stimuli unless the patient
suffers from a long-standing pain problem (l*nz, Kwan, Dostrovsky, &
Tasker, 1989; Obrador & Dierssen, 1966). Electrical stimulation of a variety
of subcortical structures in patients with chronic pain frequently evokes
pain and in some instances may even reproduces the patient's pain. Al-
though these studies involved patients with central or deafferentation pain,
electrical brain stimulation may even elicit pain responses in patients with
pain that is not long-standing and that does not involve extensive nene
injury or deafferentation. Nathan (1985) described a patient who undenryent
thalamic stimulation for a movement disorder. The patient had been suf-
fering from a toothache for 10 days prior to the operation. Electrical stimu-
lation of the thalamus reproduced the toothache.
Inputs from the Periphery. There is evidence that in some cases the
reactivation of a pain memory requires a peripheral trigger. Leriche $9n)
described a patient who did not experience phantom limb pain until 6 years
after amputation, when an injection into the stump instantly and perma-
nently, revived the pain of a former painful ulceration of the Achilles ten-
don. Nathan (1962, 1985) reported a similar phenomenon after applying
noxious stimuli to the stump of an amputee who later reexperienced the
pain of an ice-skating injury he had sustained 5 years earlier when his leg
was intact. Katz and Melzack (1990) reported a patient with an amputation
below the knee who discovered that when he maximally flexed his knee he
could briefly elicit in the phantom limb, the sensation of "the dry, callused,
tight skin" he used to feel on the sole of his foot. Another amputee who
had suffered from intermittent claudication prior to amputation continued
to experience the same pain referred to the phantom calf after walking a
short distance. These reports indicate that past pains may be reexperienced
months or even years after the original injury, in some cases by a peripheral
trigger which provides the input required to activate the central neural
structures subserving the memory trace.
Inputs from Modalities Other than Somesthesis. Pain memories some-
times comprise highly complex perceptual phenomena that include com-
ponents from several modalities which were involved in the original
e:rperience. Many preamputation pains have corresponding visual elements
such as a discolored and festering diabetic ulcer, or a raw, red open surgical
wound. Some may even have associated olfactory cues including the foul
stench of putrid diabetic ulcers and gangrene. These and other examples
(Henderson & Smyth, 1948; Jacome, L978; James, 1887; Waltgrcn, 1954)
suggest that separate modality-specific sensory memories of the preampu-
tation experience may be formed at the time of injury or during episodes
of pain. The additional sensory modalities may contribute to the formation
of a higher-order functional unit during the contiguous acrivation of mo-
dality-specific representations associated with bouts of preamputation pain
(Bindra, 1978).
The role of vision is especially important since it dominates over other
sensory modalities in circumstances involving exteroceptive sensibility.
Lowerlimb amputees frequently report that it was not until they Iooked
under the bed sheets that they realized their limb had been cut off
(Gallinek, 1939; Simmel, 1956). Patients undergoing brachial plexus or spi-
nal blocks, those with complete brachial plexus avulsions, and spinal cord
transections all report vivid phantom limbs which are felt to be coincident
with the position of the real limb as determined by sight (Bors, 1951; Evans,
1962; Wynn Parry, 1980). This is demonstrated clearly when a patient's
deafferented limb is moved from one position to another with his or her
eyes closed, Under these circumstances, the felt position of the phantom
corresponds to the last seen position of the real limb. However, when the
patient's eyes are opened, the phantom is reported to "fuse" with the new
position of the real limb as perceived by sight (Bromage & Melzack, L974;
Evans, 1962;Melzack & Bromage,7973; Wallgren, 1954). It is also worth
noting that prolonged visual deprivation results in significant increases in
cutaneous sensitivity among healthy volunteers who have all their limbs in-
tact (Zubelg Flye, & Aftanaq 196l.).
These findings demonstrate the powerful influence of vision in deter-
mining the phantom limb percept. When there is a discrepancy or contra-
diction between inooming information from different modalities, or when a
state of uncertainty exists based upon somatosensory input alone, additional
inforrnation is sought via the visual sense which usually determines the per-
ceptual experience. Since amputation also results in the loss of visual and
tactile information related to the limb, the central influences that normally
inhibit established pain traces may be further reduced by the absence of
information from these external sources that could othenvise confirm or dis-
confirm the percept (e.g., of a painful diabetic ulcer) arising from the pe-
riphery. Following amputation, the likelihood of reactivation of a pain
memory that had a visual component (e.g., a diabetic ulcer) is increased
since the potential inhibitory effect of vision has also been removed. In gen-
eral, as the number of modalities involved in the preamputation pain expe-
rience increase (and thus the more sources of potential feedback are
removed), the greater is the probability of reactivating a past pain once the
limb has been removed since there are fewer senses available to provide a
reality-based check (i.e., exert an inhibitory influence) on the perceptual
processes generating the phantom.
l,eventhal (1982) has proposed a similar conceptualization in which
a schematic-emational mechanism generates a @ncrete (nonsemantig non-
propositional) multicomponent code of sensory and affective events. This
multimodal representation is formed through integration of information
from a variety of senses during repeated or multiple events that evoke simi-
lar emotional states and may be (re-) activated even in the absence of many
of the stimulus con{igurations that were present during its formation. The
present conceptualization of the somatosensory memory component differs
somewhat from l-eventhal's schematic-emotional mechanism. Whereas an
affectively charged experience may facilitate the formation of the somato-
sensory memory component, the affective state that accompanies the uni-
fied experience of a pain memory after amputation is not thought to be a
reactivation (i.e., a memory) but is believed to be generated on a moment-
by-moment basis, determined, in part, by current sensory input and cogni-
tive-evaluative processes (see section on cognitive and affective processes).
The Use of Language. Language may play an important role in the
development and reactivation of pain memories since it appears to facilitate
integration of information from various sense modalities (Bindra, 1978;
Marks, 1978). In particular, the analogic aspect of the verbal message con-
veys meaning by likening certain qualities (e.g., sensory) of the pain expe-
rience to some other experisnss-whsther fancied or real-and is aided
by using such figures of speech as simile, metaphor and hyperbole, or more
subtly through allegory. Thus consider one woman's bittersweet description
of the pins-and-needles sensation so characteristic of phantoms, as "cham-
pagre bubbles and blisters" after a left shoulder amputation simultaneously
marked the end of a prolonged period of suffering and the beginning of
life without an arm (Janovic & Glass, 1985). Or consider the patient with
diabetes mellitus who describes the burning pain of a pufterying and dis-
colored gangrenous ulcer on his toe as "hellfire and brimstone."
The formation of a higher-order polymodal representation of the pain
is facilitated by the uni$,ing verbal response which captures the entire ex-
perience signaled by the contiguous activation of modality-specific repre-
sentations arising from separate sensory channels (e.g., visual, olfactory,
somatosensory). The foregoing implies that, after repeated bouts of pain,
information signaling the presence of an injury in one modality would ac-
tivate corresponding representations in other modalities (e.g., in the ab-
sence of input from the painful part after amputation). In this context,
language functions to simultaneously access multimodal representations,
strengthen their interconnections, and, through convergence of input to
neocortical association areas, facilitate both the formation of a pain mem-
ory as well as its reactivation after amputation.
Prychopathologt and Emotional Disturbance.It is not uncommon for
proponents of theories of phantom limb pain to discount as psychological
in origin pain that could not be explained on the basis of current physi-
ological and anatomical knowledge (Bailey & Moersch, 1941; Henderson
& Smyth, 1948; T-akoff, 1990). The practice of relegating certain inexplica-
ble phenomena to the psychological or emotional realm may free the theo-
rist from considering them further, but it changes how the amputee is
viewed and treated, and implicitly blames him or her for the pain. It is
crucial to differentiate legitimate attempts to explain how psychopathology
influences phantorn limb experience from attempts to use the label as an
explanation.
It has been argued that the similarity of pain before and after arn-
putation represents a psychopathological response to amputation in which
the psychological or emotional importance of the preamputation pain de-
termines the likelihood of its reexperience in the phantom limb. Henderson
and Smyth (1948) described the case of a soldier who sprained his ankle
jumping from a truck and therefore could not keep up with his companions.
Shortly after he was wounded in the same leg above the ankle and was
taken prisoner. The leg was amputated a few days later but he continued
to experience only the pain of the ankle sprain. The soldier remarked that
had it not been for the sprain, he would not have been captured. Bailey
and Moersh (1941) described a patient whose phantom included the sen-
sation of a wood sliver that had been under the nail of his index finger at
the time of amputation. They discussed the importance of "both psychical
and physical trauma" at or near the time of amputation and concluded
that the persistence of preamputation pain represents an "obsession neu-
rosis."
These case reports raise the possibility that emotional and psycho-
logical disturbances contribute to pain that persists after amputation but
their conclusions should be viewed as hypotheses to be tested in a pro-
spective study of patiens scheduled for amputation. In seeking rational ex-
planations for phantom limb pain, patients, clinicians, and researchers may
conclude that the significance of the preamputation pain was instrumental
in its representatior in the phantom limb. Furthermore, any psychological
theory must take into account the literature documenting the recurrence
of cornq ingrown toenails, calluses, etc., which, prior to amputation, are
rarely considered psychologically important to the patient.
The only study to compare subjects reporting pain memories with
those who did not have phantom limb pain or those who had phantom
limb pain that bore no resemblance to their preamputation failed to find
any significant inter-group differences in depression, anxiety, or personality
(Katz & Melzack, 1990). Thus, at the time of inten'riew, approximately 5
years after amputation, there was no evidence to suggest that levels of psy-
chopathology or emotional disturbance were different for subjects who re-
ported phantom limb pain of any type compared to pain-free subjects.
However, as noted above, the relationship between emotional disturbance
and psychopathology at the time of injury (or the significance of the injury)
and the subsequent development of a phantom limb pain memory has yet
to be addressed in a prospective study.
Pain memories also occur in certain psychiatric patients in the ab-
sence of deafferentation and without positive physical signs of peripheral
injury (Bressler, Cohen, & Magnussen, 1955; Engel, 1959; Szasz, 1949). Pa-
tients presenting with this clinical picture may obtain a diagnosis of con-
version hysteria or embark on a fruitless course of treatment focused at
the periphery. In his seminal paper on the "pain-prone patient " Engel
(1959) introduced the concept of a pain memory to explain his observation
that, during emotionally stressful circumstances, certain psychiatric patients
reported repeated bouts of pain similar in quality and location to a past
pain. The circumstances under which the pains recurred were believed to
be s'.rnbolic of the traumatic event in which the pain was first experienced.
According to Engel, "the capacity to experience pain in the first place de-
velops from numerous peripherally induced experiences but thereafter pain
experience, like visual or auditory experience, may occnr without the cor-
responding stimulation of the end organ . . . . The term 'pain memories'
refers to the ideational mmplexes, conscious and unconscious, associated
with past pain experiences, stimulation of which may later give rise to pain.
This pain is not the 'old' pain anymore than the joy evoked by certain
memories is the same joy that was felt on the occasion of the original joyous
experience" (Engel, 1959, pp. 900-901). Engel was careful to leave open
the possibility that not all patients suffering from the recurrence of a past
pain have pain of psychological origin in the sense that warrants the psy-
chiatric diagnosis of the "pain-prone patient." We do not know the factors
responsible for the development and maintenance of pain memories in
these patients nor do we know how they differ from the pain memories
reported by amputees.
Cogttitive and Affective Processes. A separate but related issue con-
cerns the role played by nonpathological cognitive and affective processes
in the development or subsequent expression of pain memories after am-
putation. Recent work in the field of mood and memory has demonstrated
that material with high affective loading is learned best (Singer & Salovey,
1988). Moreover, mood state during recall may enhance retrieval of specific
information that is compatible in content with that feeling state (see Isen,
L987, for a review). These fildings suggest that the role of affect in pain
memories might be twofold: {1) to facilitate the formation of the somato-
sensory and cognitive memory components, perhaps through fhe peripheral
and central release of neuroendocrine products into the general circulation,
and (2) to facilitate the reactivation of both memory components by cre-
ating a central emotional state similar in affective tone to that experienced
prior to amputationo biasing attention, information processing, and memory
functioning in favor of pain-related material.
For example, traumatic injuries incurred as a result of an accident or
an emergency surgical procedure performed without anesthetic form the
basis of highly specific and vivid declarative memories (Katz & Melzack,
1990) much like "flashbulb memories" that occur after extremely stressful
events (Squire, 1987). The events surrounding these traumatic preamputa-
tion injuries may be reexperienced accompanied by high levels of anxiety.
The nature and severity of the initial traumatic injury, the similarity of pain
before and after amputation, and the subsequent disabiliry and suffering
suggest a stress-related, posttraumatic chronic pain syndrome precipitated
by the initial trauma (Engel, 1959; Muse, 1985, 1986). In these cases, the
stress response associated with the initial trauma may be instrumental in
the formation of a pain memory. In addition, specific cognitive or affective
domains related to the traumatic event may become sensitized so that they
develop the capacity to serve as central triggers for the reactivation of the
pain after amputation.
Final$, the nature and origin of the emotional response that accom-
panies a pain memory requires comment. We have proposed that the uni-
fied experience of a pain memory involves information from separate
somatosensory and cognitive memory components. However, it is clear that
in many cases, pain memories, like most painful experiences, are also ac-
companied by an aversive emotional state and a desire to be free of the
pain (Melzack & Casey, 1968; Melzack & Wall, 1988). The affective or
emotional tone, unlike the somatosensory and cognitive components, does
not appear to be a reactivation of a previously stored representation. It is
generated on a moment-by-moment basis and is determined by the com-
bined information present in the two memory components. Thus patients
modulate their affective response as a joint function of (1) the intensity,
quality, and location of the sensory-discriminative aspects of the experience
and (2) a cognitive appraisal of the somatosensory component including
its meaning, expectations about its duration, the patients' ability to cope,
and other declarative information.
CONCLUSIONS
The material presented in this paper reveals that the phantom limb
is not perceived as a static entity but as a frequently changing perceptual
experience. Phantom limb phenomena range from simple, diffuse sensa-
tions of tingling to perceptually complex experiences of pains and lesions
that originally were felt in the limb prior to amputation. While phantom
pains and other sensations frequently are triggered by the perception of
salient events, thoughts, and feelings, there is no evidence that the painful
or painless phantom limb is a symptom of a psychological disorder. The
sympathetic nervous system may provide an important link between higher
brain centers involved in cognitive and affective processes and phantom
limb sensations through its peripheral actions on primary afferents located
in stump neuromas. Pharmacologic and nonpharmacologic treatments
geared toward reducing sympathetic outflow may prove effective in man-
aging phantom limb pain for some amputees. Taken together, the data are
consistent with Melzack's (1989) concept of a neuromatrix which postulates
(1) the various qualities of experience of the limb before and after ampu-
tation are virtually indistinguishable because they both reflect coordinated
activity among the sarne neural networks in the brain, and (2) inputs from
the periphery may trigger or modulate phantom limb sensations and pains
but are not necessary for any of the qualities of experience.
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